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Pearl Harbor is a harbor on the island of Oʻahu, Hawaii, west of
Honolulu. Much of the harbor and surrounding lands is a United States
Navy deep-water naval base. It is also the headquarters of the U.S.
Pacific Fleet. The attack on Pearl Harbor by the Empire of
Japan
on December 7, 1941 brought the United States into
World War
II. Pearl Harbor was
originally an extensive, shallow embayment called Wai Momi (meaning
"harbor of pearl") or Pu'uloa by the Hawaiians. Pu'uloa was regarded
as the home of the shark goddess Ka'ahupahau and her brother (or son)
Kahi'uka. In Hawaiian legends, Keaunui, the head of the powerful and
celebrated Ewa chiefs, is attributed the honour of having cut a
navigable channel near the present Puuloa saltworks, by which the
great estuary, now known as "Pearl River," was in all subsequent ages
rendered accessible to navigation. Making due allowance for legendary
amplification of a known fact, the estuary doubtless had an outlet for
its waters where the present gap is; but the legend is probably
correct in giving Keaunui the credit of having widened it and deepened
it, so as to admit the passage of canoes, and even larger vessels, in
and out of the Pearl River estuary. The harbor was teeming with
pearl-producing oysters until the late 1800s.
Attack on Pearl Harbor
The attack on Pearl Harbor (or Hawaii Operation, as
it was called by the Imperial General Headquarters) was a surprise
military strike conducted by the Japanese navy against the United
States' naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on the morning of Sunday
December 7, 1941, later resulting in the United States becoming
militarily involved in World War II. It was intended as a preventive
action to keep the U.S. Pacific Fleet from influencing the war Japan
was planning to wage in Southeast Asia against Britain, the
Netherlands, and the United States. The attack consisted of two aerial
attack waves totaling 353 aircraft, launched from six Japanese
aircraft carriers.
The attack sank four U.S. Navy battleships (two of which were raised
and returned to service late in the war) and damaged four more. The
Japanese also sank or damaged three cruisers, three destroyers, and
one minelayer, destroyed 188 aircraft, and caused personnel losses of
2,402 killed and 1,282 wounded. The power station, shipyard,
maintenance, and fuel and torpedo storage facilities, as well as the
submarine piers and headquarters building (also home of the
intelligence section) were not hit. Japanese losses were minimal, at
29 aircraft and five midget submarines, with 65 servicemen killed or
wounded.
The strike was intended to neutralize the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and
hence protect Japan's advance into Malaya and the Dutch East Indies,
where Japan sought access to natural resources such as oil and rubber.
Both the U.S. and Japan held long-standing contingency plans for war
in the Pacific which were continuously updated as tensions between the
two countries steadily increased during the 1930s, with the Japanese
expansion into Manchuria and French Indochina greeted by steadily
increased levels of embargoes and sanctions from the United States and
other nations.
In 1940, under the authority granted by the Export Control Act, the
U.S. halted shipments of airplanes, parts, machine tools, and aviation
gasoline, which was perceived by Japan as an unfriendly act.[8] The
U.S. did not stop oil exports to Japan at that time in part because
prevailing sentiment in Washington was that such an action would be an
extreme step, given Japanese dependence on U.S. oil,[9][10] and likely
to be considered a provocation by Japan.
Following Japanese expansion into French Indochina after the fall of
France, the U.S. ceased oil exports to Japan in the Summer of 1941, in
part because of new American restrictions on domestic oil consumption.President
Franklin D. Roosevelt had earlier moved the Pacific Fleet to
Hawaii and ordered a military buildup in the Philippines in the hope
of discouraging Japanese aggression in the Far East. As the Japanese
high command was certain that any attack on the United Kingdom's
Southeast Asian colonies would bring the U.S. into the war, a
preventive strike appeared to be the only way for[12] Japan to avoid
U.S. naval interference. An invasion of the Philippines was also
considered to be necessary by Japanese war plans, while for the U.S.,
reconquest of the same had been included in War Plan Orange as far
back as 1897.
While the attack accomplished its intended objective, it was
completely unnecessary. Unbeknownst to Isoroku Yamamoto, who conceived
the original plan, the U.S. Navy had decided as far back as 1935 to
abandon 'charging' across the Pacific towards the Philippines in
response to an outbreak of war (in keeping with the evolution of War
Plan Orange). The U.S. instead adopted "Plan Dog" in 1940, which
emphasized keeping the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) out of the eastern
Pacific and away from the shipping lanes to Australia while the U.S.
concentrated on defeating Nazi Germany.
The attack was an important engagement of World War II.
Unintentionally occurring before a formal declaration of war (which
had been scheduled to be delivered shortly prior to the attack
beginning), it pushed U.S. public opinion from isolationism to the
acceptance of participation in the war being unavoidable. The lack of
warning led Roosevelt to call it "a date which will live in infamy."
Though the attack inflicted large-scale
destruction, the damage was not significant in terms of American fuel
storage, maintenance, and intelligence capabilities. Had Japan
destroyed the American carriers, the Pacific Fleet's ability to
conduct offensive operations would have been crippled for a year or so
(given no diversions from the Atlantic Fleet). As it was, the
elimination of the battleships left the U.S. Navy with no choice but
rely on its aircraft carriers and submarines — the very weapons with
which the U.S. Navy halted and eventually reversed the Japanese
advance. A major flaw of Japanese strategic thinking was a belief the
ultimate Pacific battle would be fought by battleships, in keeping
with the doctrine of Captain Alfred Mahan. As a result, Yamamoto (and
his successors) hoarded battleships for a "decisive battle" that never
happened.
Ultimately, targets not on Genda's list, such as the submarine base
and the old headquarters building, proved more important than any
battleship. It was submarines that immobilized the Imperial Japanese
Navy's heavy ships and brought Japan's economy to a standstill by
crippling the transportation of oil and raw materials. Also, the
basement of the Old Administration Building was the home of the
cryptanalytic unit which contributed significantly to the Midway
ambush and the Submarine Force's success.
Admiral Hara Tadaichi summed up the Japanese result by saying, "We won
a great tactical victory at Pearl Harbor and thereby lost the war." |
